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Abstract
We argue that the complex numbers are an irreducible object of quan-
tum probability: this can be seen in the measurements of geometric phases
that have no classical probabilistic analogue. Having the complex phases
as primitive ingredient implies that we need to accept non-additive prob-
abilities. This has the desirable consequence of removing constraints of
standard theorems about the possibility of describing quantum theory
with commutative variables. Motivated by the formalism of consistent
histories and keeping an analogy with the theory of stochastic processes,
we develop a (statistical) theory of quantum processes: they are charac-
terised by the introduction of a “density matrix” on phase space paths (it
thus includes phase information) and fully reproduces quantum mechani-
cal predictions. We can write quantum differential equations (in analogy
to Langevin equation) that could be interpreted as referring to individ-
ual quantum systems. We describe the reconstruction theorem by which
a quantum process can yield the standard Hilbert space structure if the
Markov property is imposed. We discuss the relevance of our results for
the interpretation of quantum theory (a sample space is possible if prob-
abilities are non-additive) and quantum gravity (the Hilbert space arises
here after the consideration of a background causal structure).
1 Introduction
... Is what the matrix-physicists and q-number-physicists say true - that the
∗anastop@phys.uu.nl
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wave equation describes only the behavior of a statistical ensemble, just like the
so-called Fokker differential equation?...
Schro¨dinger to Planck, 1927
This quotation is from a letter Schro¨dinger sent to Planck [1] after the 5th
Solvay Congress in 1926. In this congress the matrix mechanics of Heisenberg
and the wave mechanics of Schro¨dinger had faced each other and were recon-
ciled by the brilliant idea of Born to interpret Schro¨dinger’s wave function as
corresponding to probability.
This proved to be one of the last pieces in the puzzle towards the development
of a full-fledged quantum theory. But Schro¨dinger was not satisfied with this
interpretation; he distrusted the philosophy underlying the physical ideas of
Heisenberg, Born and Bohr (“the matrix-physicists and q-number-physicists” in
the quotation). In fact, he wanted to interpret the wave function as a physical
wave, but he could not: the wave function was defined on the configuration
space and not on the physical space, as any physical wave ought to.
Fokker’s equation, to which Schro¨dinger refers is known today as the Fokker-
Planck equation. It is the equation that describes the time evolution of the
probability density in Brownian motion. For Schro¨dinger it was natural to
consider that a probabilistic interpretation of the wave function would amount
to its having a physical function analogous to that of a classical probability
distribution. In such a case one could say that the wave function provides the
description of a statistical ensemble rather than an individual quantum system.
But the interpretation of Schro¨dinger’s equation as a Fokker-Planck type
of equation did not gain ground and for good reason. The structure of these
equations are very distinct. The Fokker-Planck equation reads
∂
∂t
ρ = Lρ, (1. 1)
where ρ is a probability distribution and L a linear operator in the space, where
the ρ live. Schro¨dinger’s equation is of course
i
∂
∂t
ψ = Hψ (1. 2)
H is the Hamiltonian, a self-adjoint operator on the Hilbert space, where the
ψ live. The difference between these two equations and what distinguishes
between classical and quantum probability is the presence of the complex unity
i. Well, you might argue that complex numbers are not really measurable
quantities, just a convenient device to simplify the writing of equations; indeed,
Schro¨dinger’s equation can be written without the use of i by splitting it into
two equations, one for the real and one for the imaginary part of ψ. However,
physical observables arise out of the probability distribution ρ = |ψ|2, so even
if we forego the use of complex numbers they will reappear in the form of the
U(1) invariance of the probabilities.
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In effect, what distinguishes quantum from classical probability is the pres-
ence of the complex numbers, not so much in the dynamics, but as the U(1)
symmetry of the probability assignment.
Coming back to the Fokker-Planck equation, we note that they it is a part
of the more general theory of stochastic processes. The stochastic processes can
describe the dynamics in two ways: either through the Fokker-Planck equation
by writing a deterministic equation for the probability density that refers to an
ensemble of physical systems, or through stochastic differential equations (like
the Langevin equation) that can be interpreted as referring to the behaviour of
an individual system evolving under some random forces. In classical probabil-
ity, we then have the following diagram
Fokker-Planck eqn. ← stochastic processes → Langevin eqn.
If we try to interpret Schro¨dinger’s equation as analogous to the Fokker-Planck
equation, we immediately see that we lack both the general theory in which
it will be embedded and the description (analogous to differential equations)
that could be interpreted as referring to individual quantum systems. So the
corresponding diagram has two gaps in it
Schro¨dinger’s eqn. ← X1 theory → X2 eqn.
Nelson attempted to fill the gap in his stochastic mechanics programme [2, 3],
where for X1 he considered again the theory of stochastic processes and for
X2 again stochastic differential equations
1. However, this description cannot
account for all quantum phenomena as it violates Bell’s theorem. In fact, no
stochastic process can reproduce all quantum mechanical predictions [4].
In this talk we are going to show how to fill in the previous diagram, with-
out diverging from the predictions of standard quantum theory; we are going to
write a class of theories which is modelled on stochastic processes but are not
stochastic processes themselves, since they intrinsically incorporate the appear-
ance of the complex numbers (or if you prefer a U(1) symmetry). This class of
theories we shall call quantum processes. They have been developed in a chain
of argumentation starting from the consistent histories approach to quantum
theory and the presence of the geometric phase. Quantum processes is the X1
in our previous diagram; they can be unravelled to write full analogues of the
stochastic differential equations, which could perhaps be interpreted as referring
to individual system.
In general, our approach is very close to the ideas about quantum theory,
that Einstein expressed in his later years [5] (in which it was made clear that
his disagreement with quantum theory was not on reasons of determinism, but
1He actually considered the Madelung equations that are derived from Schro¨dinger’s equa-
tion and the probability rule.
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on reasons of realism)
“... ... The concept that the ψ-function completely describes the physical be-
haviour of the individual single system is untenable. (...) But if one regards
the ψ-function as the description of an ensemble, it furnishes statements that
correspond satisfactorily to those of classical mechanics and at the same time
account for the quantum structure of reality.... ...”
In this paper we demonstrate, that this attitude is not forbidden by any non-go
theorem of quantum mechanics; indeed at the mathematical level we can even
write equations that could be interpreted as referring to individual systems.
And, at least for the author, this attitude is in no way incompatible with the
basic physical insights, that were put into the structure of quantum theory by
Heisenberg and Bohr.
2 Classical vs quantum probability
Quantum theory was built in the late twenties and by the early thirties its ba-
sic principles and structures had been put in place. During the same period,
classical probability was set in a solid axiomatic framework in the work of Kol-
mogorov. Kolmogorov founded probabilistic calculus on measure theory and
thus removed ambiguities plaguing other intuitive approaches to probability.
In particular, measure theory provided a framework, by which the theory of
stochastic processes could be rigorously developed.
This was arguably one of the most important results in 20th century’s ap-
plied mathematics; in particular, it influenced the more mathematically-minded
people that worked on the foundations of quantum theory. In particular, it was
soon apparent that probability theory and quantum mechanics seemed to share
the same basic “physical” concepts, even if their mathematical implementation
is distinct. Classical probability theory is defined on a sample space Ω, which
is an ordinary set (often a manifold), while quantum theory is defined on a
complex Hilbert space H .
A theory such as classical probability is a mathematical framework by which
physical phenomena can be modeled, so that the statistical results (mean val-
ues, ratios of events) measurements can be predicted. So is quantum theory, at
least in the Kopenhagen interpretation. Both theories employ the notions of
1. Observables: An observable is a physical quantity, whose value we measure.
It is assumed that what we observe can only be a real number, since it is with
respect to real numbers (distances in dials) that we encode all experimental in-
formation. It has to be a single-valued object, so that when we have a concrete
measurement situation there will be no ambiguity as to the quantity we mea-
sure. Classically an observable is a measurable function on Ω, while quantum
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mechanically a self-adjoint operator on H .
2. Events: As events we characterise the possible outcomes of individual ex-
periments: an event corresponds to a property that is verified by an experiment,
e.g. the particle passed through a slit located in that particular place. Quantum
mechanical events are represented by projection operators and classical ones by
measurable subsets of the sample space.
3. States: A state corresponds to the preparation of the physical system, before
the measurement is carried out. As such, it contains information as much about
the nature of the physical system as about the preparation procedure that was
used for the experiment. A state should be a mathematical object that would
be able to provide all information that can be accessed experimentally. If we
think that in experiments we can determine mean values for observables and
(perhaps) probabilities to events, the state should be an object that provides
these. In classical probability theory a state corresponds to a probability dis-
tribution, while in quantum theory (thanks to Gleason’s theorem) by a density
matrix. Note, however, that in representing the operational notion of the state
by such mathematical objects we assumed that the probabilities that corre-
spond to physical systems satisfy a number of properties. Most important of
them is the additivity condition, that if A and B are two independent events
then p(A∪B) = p(A)+p(B). This is a theoretical “prejudice” rather than an ax-
iom that arises naturally out of the consideration of the measurement processes.
In any case, starting from the work of von Neumann, Birkhoff, Wigner and
Jordan [6, 7] in the thirties, an ever increasing number of mathematical physi-
cists considered quantum theory to be nothing but a generalised probability
theory, i.e. a theory sharing the same basic objects as classical probability the-
ory. This attitude is apparent in many schemes of axiomatisation of quantum
theory, that want to get rid of the (mathematically) unintuitive structure of a
Hilbert space (while keeping the non-commutativity of observables), by substi-
tuting it with something simpler: algebras of observables in the C∗-algebraic
approach, lattice of propositions in quantum logic(s), convex state spaces in the
operational approach.
However, we still feel the need to ask the question, whether quantum theory
is nothing but a generalised probability theory.
Our answer here is that it is not.
The analogy between classical probability and quantum mechanics stops, when
we consider properties of the quantum system at more than one moment of
time. Because in this case
1. Interference phases appear that have no analogue in classical probability
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theory. They are closely related to the geometric phases. Most important of all,
they are measured as a statistical object.
2. The probabilities for properties defined on more than one moment of time
are non-additive.
3. The interference phases and the non-additive probabilities are closely related.
4. The natural correlation functions of the observables are probabilities generi-
cally complex-valued.
It seems that in the case of studying properties at more than one moment of
time, the complex numbers inherent in the structure of the quantum mechanical
Hilbert space become manifest.
2.1 Non-additive probabilities
To explain the non-additive probabilities in quantum theory let us consider the
following type of experiment. We have a source S, which emits some particles
(our individual quantum systems) prepared in a well-defined state |ψ〉. The
ensemble of systems is then represented by a beam; we let this beam cross two
filters represented by P and Q. A filter is an object that lets particles of the
beam pass if they satisfy a certain property or, in other words, if a particular
event occurs. In quantum theory a filter is represented by a projection operator,
hence P and Q are projectors.
Now, after the second filter Q the beam falls into a detector D and we can
measure the particles that have crossed the beams. Note that in the diagram the
distance between the source, the filters and the detector is assumed to represent
time intervals.
If the source emitted N particles and the detector detected n, then for large
N the ratio n/N ought to converge to a given number, which would be the
probability for the particles prepared in the state |ψ〉 to pass through the two
filters.
The rules of quantum theory give that this probability must be equal to
p(P, t1;Q, t2) = 〈ψ|P (t1)Q(t2)P (t1)|ψ〉 (2. 1)
P (t) : = eiHtPe−iHt,
where H is the Hamiltonian that describes the self-dynamics of the individual
system.
✐
S
P Q
D
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Now consider the following three experiments. In experiment number 1, we
put in as a first filter P1 and as second one Q. In experiment number 2, we
put as a first filter P2 = 1 − P1, i.e. the filter corresponding to the property
complementary of that of P1 and keep Q as a second filter . In experiment
number 3, we simply have filter Q. If we use the rule (2.1) for the measured
probabilities we see that
p3 6= p1 + p2. (2. 2)
This implies that the quantum mechanical probabilities do not satisfy the addi-
tivity condition. This simple experiment is a manifestation of the more general
fact for quantum theory: experiments involving properties of the system at more
than one moment of time cannot, in general, be modeled by an additive proba-
bility measure. So quantum probability for histories does not satisfy the basic
Kolmogorov axioms for probabilities.
2.2 Consistent histories
Well, why would we mind if the probabilities are non-additive? Non-additivity
of implies you lose an important rule of inference. Consider that you have two
exclusive events A and B, that are also exhaustive (one or the other can happen
and nothing else). If we measure the probability for A and we find p(A) = 1,
then we can be certain that the event B would never occur in any repetition of
this experiment, since p(B) has to equal zero. If probabilities are non-additive,
then the fact that p(A) = 1 does not imply that p(B) = 0 and the event B
would take place in the experiments with non-zero frequency.
In a nutshell, even if the probability of an event is 1, we cannot preclude
that its complement will never happen. Is this so bad? Not really if we have an
operational stance, that quantum theory describes experiments in ensembles.
However, it could be problematic if one wants to claim that the present formal-
ism of quantum theory provides a theory for individual closed systems, because
it would dramatically limit its predictability.
One way to resolve this problem (assuming it is a problem) is the consistent
histories approach. This was developed by Griffiths [8], Omne´s [9], Gell-Mann
and Hartle [10, 11]. This work is motivated from its elegant formulation that
has been developed by Isham [12, 13, 14] and Savvidou [15, 16].
As far as this issue goes, the key idea of the consistent histories approach
is that one can have additive probabilities if one is restricted within particular
sets of histories, known as consistent sets. More precisely
1. A general history α is represented by a collection of projection operators
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αti at successive instants of time
α = (αt1 , αt2 , . . . , αtn), . (2. 3)
2. From these operators we can define an operatorCα = αtn(tn) . . . αt2(t2)αt1(t1)
and a complex-valued functional on pairs of histories
d(α, β) = Tr(Cαρ0C
†
β). (2. 4)
This is known as the decoherence functional.
3. If in a exhaustive and exclusive set of histories
d(α, β) = 0, α 6= β (2. 5)
then d(α, α) is a probability for the history α and corresponds to an additive
probability measure. The satisfaction of condition (2.5) renders a set of histories
consistent.
The additivity of probabilities in each consistent set allows us to use the fact
that probability one for an event means probability zero for its complement.
This can be exploited to define the logical/physical notion for implication. The
idea is that if we get by measurement a definite result for an individual system,
we can employ the definability of this implication to identify other properties
that this system has satisfied. However, implication is defined only within given
consistent sets; hence when we employ implication in different consistent sets
we can derive contrary results from the same definite (measured) event. This
is a more general problem of realist interpretational schemes 2 and is related to
the Kochen-Specker theorem.
However, the formalism of consistent histories makes sense irrespective of
the interpretation: it can equally well be considered in a Copenhagen frame-
work, in which we are content to provide predictions for outcomes of ensemble
measurements. The merit of the formalism lies in the fact that it allows the
description of quantum systems using covariant objects (histories) [11]. As such
it seems more adequate to deal with basic problems in the quantisation of the
gravitational field, such as the problem of time (see [17] for this perspective).
Moreover, the object that was introduced by the consistent histories approach,
the decoherence functional is very convenient: it will be shown to contain the
full information that can be extracted from a quantum process, even its non-
probabilistic aspects.
2In our use, we employ the word realist to denote the attitude that the quantum mechanical
formalism refers to properties of individual systems.
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2.3 Complex-valued correlation functions
Whenever we have a probabilistic system, there is a well defined prescription by
which the temporal correlation functions can be determined. Assume we have
an observable A, that can be spectrally analysed as A =
∑
i aiPi, where Pi are
filters that can be experimentally employed. Now we repeat the experiment in
figure 1 with Pi for P and Pj for Q for all possible combinations of i and j. We
can then measure the probabilities p(i, t1; j, t2).
The statistical correlation function is then
〈At1At2〉S =
∑
ij
aiajp(i, t1; j, t2). (2. 6)
It is clearly a real number. However, it is an object that cannot be naturally
written in terms of the operators A. Moreover, it depends sensitively in the
resolution of the observable in terms of the spectral projections (unlike statistical
correlation functions in classical probability theory).
From quantum theory the natural object for the correlation function (that
does not depend on the spectral resolution of the observable) is
〈At1At2〉Q = 〈ψ(t1)|Ae
iH(t2−t1)Ae−iH(t2−t1)|ψ(t1)〉, (2. 7)
or the corresponding time-ordered function.
This is generically a complex-valued object and has no natural operational
interpretation as the statistical correlation function.
We should remark that temporal correlation functions have actually been
measured in quantum optics (see for instance [18]). In that case the relevant
observable is the photon number; this, however, commutes with the electro-
magnetic field’s Hamiltonian. This implies that the statistical and quantum
correlation functions coincide.
So one may pose the question, why does quantum theory give as natural
correlation functions, ones that are not operationally implementable? This is
not a very sharp question, as the answer might be simply that there is no a
priori reason to expect that it would be otherwise. However, we are going
to show that there is a deeper reason and this is that quantum correlation
functions have information from measurable quantities that do not correspond
to probabilities: interference phases.
3 Interference phases
The point is that quantum theory predicts other physical quantities that can
be determined statistically, but are not probabilities. These are the quantum
phases and more precisely the geometric phases, paradigmatic example of which
are the Bohm-Aharonov [19] and the Berry phase [20].
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Let us recall the measurement of the Bohm-Aharonov phase
⑦
The basic configuration is that of a two-slit experiment. We let a prepared
state of electrons cross through two slits and then measure the interference pat-
tern on a screen. Having stored that in memory, we repeat the experiment by
putting a solenoid (with some magnetic flux) behind one of the slits (such that
the beam does not cross it). We observe a shift into the interference pattern,
which is essentially proportional to the Bohm-Aharonov phase induced by the
magnetic flux.
Two remarks must be made for this experiment, that are valid for all ex-
periments measuring geometric phases. First, that the Bohm-Aharonov phase
is a statistical object: it is measured in terms of an interference pattern, which
is present only when a large number of electrons (thought of as corresponding
to a statistical ensemble) are left to interfere. If we carried out the experiment
with a single electron, there would be nothing to measure.
The second remark is that the geometric phase can be determined from the
study of the interference of two beams with different history. This is reminiscent
of the decoherence functional, which assigns a complex-valued object to a pair
of histories. This suggests that the decoherence functional is somehow related
to the geometric phases. This loose connection will turn out to be very precise:
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we can show that the decoherence functional is actually constructed from the
mathematical object that is responsible for the presence of geometric phases:
the Berry connection 3 [23].
More strongly, we can explicitly describe, how the off-diagonal elements of
the decoherence functional can be explicitly measured; the corresponding mea-
surement scheme is identical to the ones used for the determination of another
version of the geometric phase, known as the Pancharatnam phase [24, 25]. This
phase essentially corresponds to the argument of the inner product between two
states φ〉 and |ψ〉. It is manifested in the following generic situations
1. Prepare two systems in the states |ψ〉 and |φ〉.
2. Perform on the beam corresponding to |ψ〉 the operation |ψ〉 → eiχ|ψ〉 for a
controlled value of χ.
3. Interfere the two beams to construct the beam |f〉 = |φ〉+eiχ|ψ〉 and measure
its intensity I = 〈f |f〉.
4. Repeat the experiment for the range of all values of χ and construct the
function I(χ) giving the intensity of the measured beam as a function of the
external parameter χ. This equals
I(χ) = 2|〈ψ|φ〉| cos(χ− arg〈ψ|φ〉) (3. 1)
5. I(χ) takes its maximum value for χ = arg〈ψ|φ〉. This value of χ is the
Pancharatnam phase between the two beams.
This procedure to measure the Pancharatnam phase has been performed in
neutron interferometry [26]. The difficult part is to perform step 2, i.e. to have
a controlled way to change the phase of an individual quantum state. This can
be achieved if |ψ〉 is an eigenstate of a Hamiltonian (so that the phase only
depends on the number of periods the beam is left before interference).
Assuming that there is a prescription by which this phase change can be
performed, the above prescription can be used to measure the off-diagonal ele-
ments of the decoherence functional.
3This is a U(1) connection on the fiber bundle with base space the projective Hilbert space
and total space the Hilbert space of a quantum system [21, 22].
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⑦ ②
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✞
✝
☎
✆
S
B.S.
αt1 αt2 αtn
C
P.O.
βt′
1
βt′
m
Let us assume we have a source S preparing particles in a state |ψ〉. After
exiting S, the beam enters a beam splitter B.S. One of its components then en-
ters a sequence of filters αt1 . . . αtn and the other a sequence of filters βt′1 . . . βt′m ,
before they are recombined at C. The beam then propagates to a screen, where
its intensity is measured. Now we repeat this experiment many times, but at
each time the second component of the split beam has to pass through P.O.
which performs the operation of phase change |ψ〉 → eiχ|ψ〉. Repeating the
experiment for different values of χ, we get a function I(χ), whose maximum
determines a phase that is the argument of the value of the decoherence func-
tional between the histories (αt1 . . . αtn) and (βt′1 , . . . , βt′m). The modulus of the
phase of the decoherence functional can easily be determined by the maximum
value of I (see [27] for details).
In fact, it can be shown that the decoherence functional contains all infor-
mation that can be obtained from experiments measuring either probabilities
or relative phases. The name decoherence functional is then, rather misleading.
Gell-Mann and Hartle introduced it as the object that provides information
about decoherence of histories. However, its most important function is that it
contains the information of the relative phases, hence of coherence of histories.
For this reason a more adequate name for it would be the coherence functional
or the phase functional.
It can also be shown that the complex-valued temporal correlation func-
tions can in principle be determined by the measurement of a sufficiently large
number of interference phases as described above. In effect, if one can deter-
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mine the off-diagonal elements of a decoherence functional between a history
αij = (Pi, t1;Pj , t2) and the trivial history β = 1, then for the observable
A =
∑
i aiPi the time-ordered two-point function will read
〈At1At2〉Q =
∑
ij
aiajd(αij , 1), (3. 2)
This gives an operational scheme for the determination of the quantum corre-
lation functions through measurements analogous to the one performed for the
Pancharatnam phase. The reader is referred to [28] for details.
4 A framework for quantum processes
4.1 Phases as primitive ingredients
Usually any discussion of the principles of quantum theory consider probabilities
as the basic objects that are predicted by the formalism. But, as we showed
there is good reason to consider (also) the phases as primitive ingredients of the
formalism. We can then attempt to write an axiomatic scheme that achieves
this.
In that case, we must accept that the probabilities of the corresponding
quantum theory are non-additive, hence do not satisfy the Kolmogorov axioms.
Accepting non-additive probabilities has important consequences for the struc-
ture of the resulting quantum theory. The theorems of Bell [29] and Kochen-
Specker [30] that forbid hidden variable theories of reproducing the predictions
of quantum theory assume that the corresponding hidden variable theories are
either deterministic or stochastic. They do not forbid hidden variable theories
that are modeled by a statistical theory that is not described by Kolmogorov
probability.
Hence, by accepting phases as primitive ingredients of our formalism, we
might be able to write a theory that reproduces the predictions of quantum
mechanics, while having observables like any classical theory, purely commuta-
tive objects. This is indeed possible and we showed that in reference [28] by
simply employing the Wigner transform on the standard quantum mechanical
decoherence functional. In other words, the Hilbert space structure and the cor-
responding non-Boolean ( and non-distributive) nature of the events (usually
referred to as quantum logic) is not necessary in a theory that takes phases as
primitive ingredients.
Such a theory needs a mathematical structure analogous to that of a de-
coherence functional over a classical sample space. We shall explain in detail
how such theories are formalised and constructed: we shall call them theories
of quantum processes, because their mathematical structure is in many respects
analogous to the theory of stochastic processes.
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We will not attempt to write any interpretation of quantum theory different
from Copenhagen; we shall take a strictly operational stance and simply consider
that the theories of quantum processes refer only to measurement situations
and the probabilities and relative phases always make reference to ensembles
of individual quantum systems. We should, however, point out that our longer
term perspective is realist: we want to find a way to talk about the physics of
individual quantum system. The present is not, however, a good moment for
this purpose.
Choosing the sample space If we want to write a theory that reproduces
the results of quantum mechanics, while having a classical sample space, we
need to specify what this sample space would be. One could take the stance
that the proper quantum mechanical sample space consists of variables very
different from the ones that are naturally apparent to us: the true degrees of
freedom refer to a subquantum level of reality, quite removed from standard
physics (as for instance in [31]).
We shall take a more conservative approach here. He shall consider that
the sample space is essentially the phase space of the corresponding classical
system. There are three reasons for our choice:
1. We can show that a theory of quantum processes on the classical phase
space allows us to fully reproduce the predictions of standard quantum theory
(this is an a posteriori argument).
2. Symplectic manifolds have a very rich geometric structure, that allows us
to reproduce many classic quantum mechanical results that seem to need a pri-
ori the notion of the Hilbert space. Such is the case for Wigner’s classification of
particles (from the geometric quantisation of Konstant-Souriau [32]) and many
aspects of the spin-statistics relation [33].
3. One of our motivation for undertaking this line of research is the attempt
to write a quantum theory that has a pronounced spacetime character. In the
closely related scheme of histories quantisation, Savvidou showed that in the
space of phase space histories one can always implement a symplectic action of
the group of spacetime diffeomorphisms [17] (in the case of general relativity it
coexists with the algebra of constraints obtained by the 3+1 decomposition).
This is a very important part for any quantum theory that wants to manifest
the principle of general covariance and holds only for phase space histories (not
configuration space ones).
These are the reasons that makes us consider the phase space histories as defin-
ing the basic sample space of quantum theory. Our arguments are sufficient to
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establish the naturality of our choice; of course, they are not necessary as they
are directed by choices related to our long term aims. In any case, the formalism
we shall present makes sense for any possible sample space.
4.2 The basic axioms
4.2.1 Sample space, events, observables
At the level of observables, the structure of our theory is identical with that
of classical probability theory. That is, we assume the existence of a space
Ω of elementary alternatives. A point of Ω corresponds to the most precise
information one can extract from a measurement of the quantum system. Note,
that at this level we do not distinguish, whether Ω refers to properties of a
systems at one moment of time or to histories. Our definitions are general and
only later shall we specify the history content.
This space Ω has to be equipped with some additional structure. In general,
a measurement will yield some information stating that the system was found
in a given subset of Ω. But not all subsets of Ω are suitable to incorporate
measurement outcomes. For instance, when we consider position it is physically
meaningless to consider the subset of rational values of position (with respect
to some unit). One, therefore needs to choose a family of subsets C of Ω, that
correspond to the coarse-grained information we can obtain about the physical
systems. These sets are often called events. The family C containing the events
has to satisfy some natural mathematical conditions
i. Ω ∈ C: if an experiment is performed one of the outcomes will occur.
ii. ∅ ∈ C: it is impossible that no outcome results if an experiment is per-
formed.
iii. If A ∈ C, then Ω− A ∈ C: if A is a possible measurement outcome then so
can be its complement.
iv. If A,B ∈ C, then A ∪ B ∈ C and A ∩ B ∈ C: unions and intersections
of experimental outcomes are also possible experimental outcomes.
v. For countably many An ∈ C, n = 1, 2, . . ., ∪∞n=1 ∈ C. This is a technical
condition particularly relevant when dealing with the case where Ω is a mani-
fold.
Equipping Ω with a choice of events turns it into a measurable space.
Since in experiments we eventually come to measure real numbers (or occasion-
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ally integers, which can be embedded into the real numbers) the mathematical
object that would represent the notion of observable is a map from Ω to R.
However, not all possible maps will do: the structures corresponding to measur-
able sets have to be preserved. Such functions are called measurable and in the
language of probability theory are known as random variables. We shall denote
the space they belong to in as F (Ω).
Among all functions, important are characteristic functions of the various
subsets of Ω. These are defined as
χA(x) = 1, x ∈ Ω (4. 1)
= 0, x /∈ Ω (4. 2)
An important property of the characteristic functions is the following. If λ
is a possible value of a random variable f and Aλ = f
−1(λ), then it is evident
f =
∫
dλλχAλ . (4. 3)
4.2.2 The decoherence functional
A decoherence functional Φ 4 is a map from C ×C → C, such that the following
conditions are satisfied
B1. Null triviality: For any A ∈ C, Φ(∅, A) = 0.
In terms of our interpretation of the off-diagonal elements of the decoherence
functional as corresponding to Pancharatnam phases, there can be no phase
measurement if one of the two beams that have to be interfered is absent.
B2. Hermiticity: For A,B ∈ C, Φ(B,A) = Φ∗(A,B).
Clearly the phase difference between two histories becomes opposite if we ex-
change the sequence, by which these histories are considered.
B3. Positivity: For any A ∈ C, Φ(A,A) ≥ 0.
This amounts to the fact that the diagonal elements of the decoherence func-
tional are interpreted as probabilities (albeit non-additive). Operationally prob-
abilities are defined by the number of times a particular event occurred in the
ensemble and by definition they can only be positive.
4 Note that we changed notation for the decoherence functional from d, which is the
standard in the bibliography to Φ and was employed in the previous sections. This was done
for reasons of notational convenience (d tended to be confused with differentials). The letter
Φ stands for phase.
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B4. Normalisation: Φ(Ω,Ω) = 1.
Clearly, if no measurement takes place the intensity of the beam would never
change.
B5. Additivity: If A,B,C ∈ C and A ∩ B = ∅, then Φ(A ∪ B,C) = Φ(A,C) +
Φ(B,C).
There is no intuitive operational reason, why this should be the case. This
property is equivalent to the superposition principle of quantum theory and we
can consider that it is forced upon us by experimental results. Of course, this is
the property that makes the decoherence functional the natural object to use.
B6. Boundedness: For all A,B ∈ C, |Φ(A,B)| ≤ 1. This arises from the
operational procedure for the determination of |Φ(A,B)| [27].
These axioms are an adaptation of the axioms written by Isham and Linden
[13] for the case of consistent histories.
There are two points one needs to make regarding these axioms. First, the
properties of Φ are identical to the matrix elements of a density matrix over some
continuous basis (if this is identified with Ω). So the difference of quantum from
stochastic processes is that they have a density matrix rather than a probability
measure over the sample space of histories.
The second point is that the properties of the decoherence functional are
these of a complex probability measure on Ω×Ω. So we need not construct any
different mathematics for the development of the theory: standard measure the-
ory will suffice. In particular, we can use the Radon-Nikodym and Kolmogorov
theorems that are very important in classical probability theory. Since Φ acts
on events its action can be extended to all measurable functions on Ω, i.e. we
can write it as a map Φ : F (Ω)⊗ F (Ω)→ C.
Now, if on Ω there is a Lebesque measure dx, we can write Φ in terms of s
density υ, i.e.
Φ(dx, dx′) = υ(x, x′)dxdx′. (4. 4)
In the trivial case that Ω refers only to a moment of time, it is easy to see
that υ is written in terms of the density matrix as
υ(x, x′) = ρ(x, x′)δ(x, x′) (4. 5)
in a continuous basis (like position) or
υ(x, x′) = 〈z|ρ|z′〉〈z′|z〉, (4. 6)
in an overcomplete basis like the coherent states.
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4.3 Quantum processes
We are interested in the non-trivial case, whenever Ω is a space of histories, i.e.
it is a suitable chosen subset of ×tΓt. We shall assume t to take values in some
interval of the real line, or the real line itself. An element of Ω will then be a
path on Γ and will be written written as z(·).
Given a function f on Γ, we can define a family of functions Ft on Ω indexed
by t as
Ft[z(·)] = f(z(t)). (4. 7)
In analogy with the definition of a stochastic process, a quantum process is
defined as a triple (Ω,Φ, F at ), where
- Ω is a path space
- Φ is a decoherence functional satisfying the relevant axioms
- F at is a selected family of observables indexed by t (not necessarily of the type
(4.7)).
From the specification of the family of observables F at we can define the mixed
correlation functions Gn,m as
Gn,m(a1, t1; a2, t2; . . . ; an, tn|b1, t
′
1; b2, t
′
2; . . . ; bm, t
′
m) = (4. 8)
Φ(F a1t1 F
a2
t2
. . . F antn , F
b1
t′
1
F b2
t′
2
. . . F bmt′
m
).
Here Gn,0 are the time-ordered correlation functions, G0,m are the anti-time-
ordered and Gn,m ones containing mixed entries.
From the hierarchy Gn,m of correlation functions associated to F at we can
define the corresponding generating functional ZF [J+, J−], which is written in
terms of the sources Ja+(t), J
a
−(t) as
ZF [J+, J−] =
∞∑
n=0
∞∑
m=0
in(−i)m
n!m!
×
∑
a1,...an
∑
b1,...,bm
∫
dt1 . . . dtndt
′
1 . . . dt
′
m
×Gn,m(a1, t1; . . . ; an, tn|b1, t
′
1; . . . ; bm, t
′
m)
×Ja1+ (t1) . . . J
an
+ (tn)J
b1
− (t
′
1) . . . J
bm
− (t
′
m) (4. 9)
This is known as the closed-time-path (CTP) generating functional. It was
first introduced by Schwinger [34] and Keldysh [35]. It is particularly relevant
to the discussion of systems, in which there does not exist the symmetry of
time translation (open quantum systems, field theory in curved spacetime etc).
Clearly the CTP generating functional can be written as
ZF [J+, J−] = Φ(e
iF ·J+ , e−iF ·J−), (4. 10)
where F · J± :=
∫
dt
∑
i F
i
t J±(t).
18
Defining Φ Ω is in general a path space. In order to define Φ on it, we treat
it as a complex measure and employ an analogue of Kolmogorov ’s theorem for
probability measures on path spaces. Namely, that Φ is uniquely determined
by the discrete-time versions of the decoherence functional: i.e. by a hierarchy
of distribution functions
υn,m(z1, t1; z2, t2; . . . ; zn, tn|z
′
1, t
′
1; z
′
m, t
′
m) (4. 11)
The functions of this hierarchy need to satisfy the (Kolmogorov) additivity
condition:∫
dzn+1υ
n+1,m((z1, t1; z2, t2; . . . ; zn, tn; zn+1, tn+1|z
′
1, t
′
1; z
′
2, t
′
2; . . . ; z
′
m, t
′
m) =
υn,m(z1, t1; z2, t2; . . . ; zn, tn|z
′
1, t
′
1; z
′
2, t
′
2; . . . ; z
′
m, t
′
m). (4. 12)
The point is that a measure (hence a decoherence functional) for the continuous-
time case can be determined by the specification of only discrete-time expres-
sions.
4.4 The kinematical process
One can construct quantum processes starting from standard quantum theory,
by employing the coherent states. In general, the coherent states provide a from
a symplectic manifold Γ to the projective Hilbert space: z ∈ Γ → |z〉〈z|. If f
is a function on Γ then one can define a corresponding operator on the Hilbert
space as
A =
∫
dzf(z)|z〉〈z|. (4. 13)
This is not the only choice, but as we shall see it is the most natural.
We want first to define the kinematical process, i.e. the quantum process
that corresponds to a system with vanishing Hamiltonian.
Having Γ one can define the space Ω of continuous paths on Γ and the family
of functions F at associated to the f
a of equation (4.13). All that is missing
from the definition of a quantum processes is the specification of a decoherence
functional. This is achieved by specifying the hierarchy of ordered distribution
functions υn,m. To do so, we write the time instants in terms of their ordering
t1 ≤ t2 ≤ . . . tn, and t′1 ≤ t
′
2 ≤ . . . ≤ t
′
m. If we write αˆz = |z〉〈z| we will have
υn,mz0 (z1, t1; z2, t2; . . . ; zn, tn|z
′
1, t
′
1; z
′
2, t
′
2; . . . ; z
′
m, t
′
m) =
Tr
(
αˆznαˆzn−1 . . . αˆz2αˆz1 αˆz0αˆz′1 . . . αˆz′m−1αˆz′m
)
=
〈z′m|zn〉〈zn|zn−1〉 . . . 〈z2|z1〉〈z1|z0〉〈z0|z
′
1〉〈z
′
1|z
′
2〉 . . . 〈z
′
m−1|z
′
m〉. (4. 14)
Let us now note the following concerning the kinematical process.
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1. The expression for the distribution function factorises in products of the
form 〈z|z′〉. The knowledge of this inner product, suffices to fully determine
the kinematical process. In fact, the distribution function υn,m is known as the
n+m+ 1 Bargmann invariant [36].
2. The distributions υn,m do not depend on the values of time t, only on their
ordering. The same is true for t′. More than that, if we consider the following
cyclic ordering for the time instants t0 → t1 → t2 → . . . → tn → t′m → . . . →
t′2 → t
′
1 → t0, the distributions are invariant if we consider any time as origin
and then proceed cyclically along the arrows. In other words, the kinematic
process manifests the symmetry of a closed time path.
3. Unlike stochastic processes, in which the kinematical process is trivial (the
hierarchy of distribution functions consists only of products of delta functions),
quantum processes manifest all quantum mechanical behaviour (interferences
etc) already at the kinematical level. The introduction of dynamics requires
only the minor modification of substituting 〈z|e−iH(t−t
′)|z〉 for 〈z|z′〉 in equa-
tion (4.14).
4. Let us consider that the process being defined in the time interval [0, τ ]
and consider the distribution function υn,m for large values of n and m. Take
for simplicity n = m = N . Choose also the time instants such that |ti − ti−1| ≤
δt = τ/N for all i and similarly for t′. Also, let tn = t
′
m = τ . Then we have
a discretised approximation to a decoherence functional for continuous paths
z(·), z′(·), which for N →∞ would converge to
Φ(z(·), z′(·)) = e
−i
∫
C
〈z|d|z〉
+O(δt2) = e
i
∫
C
A
+O(δt2), (4. 15)
where C is the closed path obtained by appending the path z′(·) with reverse
orientation at the end of z(·). The distribution function for the decoherence
functional then converges at the large N limit to the holonomy of a U(1) con-
nection on Γ, the same geometrical object that is introduced in the geometric
quantisation scheme. Of course, this convergence is to be interpreted with a
grain of salt as the support of the decoherence functional is primarily not on
differentiable paths, for which the holonomy is rigorously defined.
4.5 Quantum differential equations
In any theory that is based on histories, one can sharply distinguish between
two different aspects of temporal symmetries. This has been pointed out by
Savvidou [15] and forms one of the basic features of the histories quantisation
programme. We can define a purely kinematical time translation, by which the
time translation is effected as
Ft → Ft+s, (4. 16)
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and there exists the dynamical time-translation generated by the Hamiltonian.
These are completely distinct and correspond to the different functions of the
notion of time in the physical theory (causal ordering/kinematics vs change/
dynamics).
As we showed earlier, the characteristic quantum mechanical behaviour ex-
ists already at the kinematical level and the decoherence functional depend only
on the causal ordering of the events constituting the histories. We are, therefore,
tempted to take the kinematical process as basic and seek to write a general
quantum process in terms of it. In effect, we want to view the kinematical
process as the analogue of the Wiener process in classical probability theory: a
general object through which any other process can be defined.
In classical stochastic processes the relation between a process x and the
Wiener process W 5 is expressed in terms of stochastic differential equations,
known in physics as Langevin equations. They are, in general, of the form
dxa + fa(x)dt = dW a(t). (4. 17)
In effect the Wiener term acts as a random driving force on a deterministic
equation. Can we do the same for the case of the quantum processes?
It turns out that we can. Using explicitly the distinction between the kine-
matical and dynamical time translations, we referred to earlier we can write an
analogous quantum differential equation:
dza + fa(z)dt = dξa(t), (4. 18)
where za are variables (coordinates on Γ) undergoing a quantum process with a
given Hamiltonian H , fa are some particular functions on phase space depend-
ing on the Hamiltonian [27] and ξa are variables on the phase space (the same
functions as za) but corresponding to a kinematical process. As in the classical
case, the differentials have t be interpreted with care as in general the sample
paths zat are not differentiable. This equation is written at the same level of
rigor as the standard stochastic differential equations.
In line with Einstein’s remark we gave in section one, we want to remark on
the appealing possibility that equation (4.18) can be interpreted as referring to
an individual system in analogy to the classical Langevin equations. That is,
we can consider that equation (4.18) refers to an individual system (a particle),
which is found within a “fluctuating environment”, that induces the “random
forces” ξ˙a(t). However, these forces are not distributed according to a classi-
cal probability distribution, but according to the kinematic processes (and are
possibly geometrical in origin).
We are not in a position to argue, whether this interpretation of equation
(4.18) should be taken seriously or not. The reasons are partly mathematical
5 Denoting the Wiener process as W is a shorthand: the Wiener process refers to the
underlying sample space, the particular probability measure and the basic variables W a.
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and partly physical: from the mathematical side we need to verify that such
equations are more than empty symbols: is it actually a type of equation that
can admit solutions? We hope to justify such equations by adopting the theory
of stochastic integrals (of Ito) in the quantum context. From a physical point of
view, even though we are committed to finding a description for the individual
quantum system, the picture of a particle moving under random forces is not
necessarily our first choice: it is too classical and there is no geometric naturality
(the functions f in (4.18) have no apparent geometric interpretation).
Nonetheless, equation (4.18) has large theoretical interest: it demonstrates
that it is possible in principle to unravel the statistical description of quantum
theory into a description of individual system. The description in terms of
quantum differential equations may not be fundamental, it probably is not the
physically correct way to approach individual system, but it proves a point:
a description of individual quantum systems that fully agrees in the ensemble
statistics with standard quantum theory is not impossible.
Moreover, we would like to see, whether it would be possible to simulate
its solutions numerically as we can do with stochastic processes. This would
provide a way of generating actual trajectories for individual quantum systems.
5 Reconstruction theorem
In the previous section, we showed how to obtain quantum processes starting
from quantum theory. Now, we want to invert this procedure and ask how one
can obtain standard quantum theory starting from a generic quantum process,
that satisfies the axioms stated in section .
Our result is simpler than we expected. We essentially found that we can
uniquely determine the quantum mechanical Hilbert space, the observables and
the evolution equations from the ingredients of a quantum process, if this process
satisfies the (analogue of) the Markov property. The Markov property roughly
states that if the state of the system (i.e the restricted decoherence functional at
a moment of time) is completely specified, then it contains sufficient information
to determine the state of the system at any subsequent moment of time.
The Markov property implies (this is often taken as its defining property)
that the distribution functions that define decoherence functional can be written
as
υN+1,N+1(z0, t0; z1, t1; . . . ; zN , tN−1|z
′
0, t0; z1, t1; . . . ; z
′
N−1, tN−1) =
υ(zN , z
′
N ; tN |zN−1, z
′
N−1; tN−1) . . . υ(z1, z
′
1; t1|z0, z
′
0; t0)ρ0(z0, z
′
0), (5. 1)
in terms of a propagator υ(z1, z2; t|z′1, z
′
2; t
′) and an initial “state” at t = 0 6.
6 Note that we have written only the diagonal elements of the hierarchy of functions. But
it can be easily shown that they can be used to construct the full hierarchy υn,m by virtue of
the Kolmogorov additivity condition.
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The propagator υ needs to satisfy the quantum Chapman-Kolmogorov equa-
tion:
υ(z1, z
′
1; t|z0, z
′
0; s) =
∫
dzdz′υ(z1, z
′
1; t|z, z
′; s′)υ(z, z′; s′|z0, z
′
0; s). (5. 2)
Now, what we have proven is a reconstruction theorem, which can loosely be
stated as follows.
Reconstruction theorem: Assume we have a stochastic process (Ω,Φ, F at )
that satisfies the Markov property. If in addition
i. the propagator is a smooth function of its arguments and the time entries,
ii. the process is time-homogeneous,
iii. the process is time-reversible ,
then we can reconstruct the quantum mechanical Hilbert space and the Heisen-
berg evolution equations.
Sketch of the proof: Time homogeneity means that the propagator depends
only on the time difference t−t′, hence can be written as υt(z1, z2|z′1, z
′
2). Time-
reversibility is defined as υ∗t (z1, z2|z
′
1, z
′
2) = υ−t(z1, z2|z
′
1, z
′
2). It is easy to show,
that this implies that υ is factorised as υt(z1, z2|z
′
1, z
′
2) = ψt(z1|z
′
1)ψ
∗
t (z2|z
′
2), in
terms of another kernel that also satisfies a version of the Chapman-Kolmogorov
equality
ψt(z|z
′) =
∫
dz′′ψt−s(z|z
′′)ψs(z
′′|z′). (5. 3)
The condition (i) is important. It ensures that when t→ 0, ψ remains a nice (i.e.
differentiable) function (not a distribution), say χ(z|z′) := ψ0(z|z′), hence the
kinematical process will not be trivial. In this case the Chapman-Kolmogorov
identity states that
χ(z|z′) =
∫
dz′′χ(z|z′′)χ(z′′|z′), (5. 4)
hence χ defines a projection operatorE on L2(Γ). The range of E is the quantum
mechanical Hilbert space H . Moreover, the dynamics encoded in ψt correspond
to an one-parameter group of unitary transformations that commutes with E
and can thus be projected on H giving rise to Hamiltonian evolution.
One can also use a standard GNS construction [37] to construct a family of
coherent states |z〉 on H such that
〈z|z′〉 = χ(z|z′). (5. 5)
In this case a function f on Γ is mapped into an operator A =
∫
dz|z〉〈z|.
In particular, a phase space cell C is mapped to a positive operator PC =∫
C
dz|z〉〈z|.
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One remark needs to be made at this point. Our procedure so far is axiomatic
and not constructive. If one wants to explicitly construct the quantum process
one needs to write the coherent states propagator. This can be rigorously defined
by a phase space path integral, in which the Planck’s constant enters through a
Riemannian metric on the phase space that is employed for regularisation [38].
6 Interpretational issues
The difference between quantum processes and standard quantum theory lies
only in the determination of which object correspond to sharp events. Quantum
mechanics admits projection operators, while the theory of quantum processes
admits phase space cells. These are represented by a positive operator-valued-
measure C → Cˆ =
∫
C
dz|z〉〈z|, for any measurable subset C of Γ.
The question then arises, which of the basic principles of quantum theory is
(are ) violated by this change and whether this violation has empirical conse-
quences.
It can be shown [27] that the only difference between the theory of quantum
processes and standard quantum mechanics is (what we shall call) the spectral
principle
The possible values for an observable correspond to the points of the spectrum
of the corresponding operator.
It is a corollary of this postulate, that a proposition about possible values of an
observable is represented by a projection operator.
Now, in a quantum process the spectrum of an operator is simply not rele-
vant to the values of the corresponding observable, because at the fundamental
level observables are functions on the history space Ω. Clearly there is little dif-
ference as far as observables with continuous spectrum are concerned (position,
momentum etc). The difference lies, of course, in the case of observables with
discrete spectrum.
The case of discrete spectrum is, in fact, what has given quantum phenomena
their name, as it is this through the discrete spectrum of operators that the
paradigmatic quantum behaviour is manifested: historically it was the black
body radiation, the photoelectric effect and the Bohr’s atom transitions that put
discreteness as a basic feature of the new mechanics. For this reason the spectral
postulate was highlighted in all early work of quantum theory: it provided a
simple solution to the problems that had faced a generation of physicists. Later
mathematical development -namely the spectral theorem - offered this postulate
the additional justification of mathematical elegance.
It would seem that this is one of the most solid postulates of quantum
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mechanics, the last one to be taken away from any possible modification of the
theory. After all it provides the solution to the physical puzzles that led to
quantum mechanics. However, as we are going to argue it is the postulate of
quantum theory that is least justified empirically, when taken by itself.
To see this we shall consider the case of atom spectroscopy, which has been
historically the main arena justifying the spectral postulate. When we study
the electromagnetic radiation emitted from atoms, we see that the intensity of
the electromagnetic field has peaks in particular discrete values of the frequency.
Then assuming energy conservation, the photons are viewed as arising from a
transition between two ”states” of an atom , each of which is characterised by
a sharp value of energy. The fact that we measure a number of sharp peaks
rather than a smoother distribution of field intensity plotted versus frequency,
leads to the conclusion that the possible values of atom’s energy are discrete.
If we take that this experiment measures the energy of the atom, then we have
discrete values for the energy, something that is naturally explained in terms
of the spectral postulate: in any individual measurement only points of the
spectrum of the operator are obtained.
We believe that this is a fair summary of the argument that leads to the
acceptance of the spectral postulate in this particular context. We shall now
see, that the conclusions of the argument is by no means necessary. Let us
first make the too obvious remark, that the measurement of the intensity peaks
never yields sharp values, rather only peaks with finite width. The width is due
not only to experimental errors, but comes fundamentally from the time-energy
uncertainty relation. Hence, it is only in an idealisation that the atom’s energy
values are discrete.
However, the most important argument is that the description in terms of
atom transitions is semiclassical rather than quantum. What we measure in
spectroscopy is the energy/frequency of the electromagnetic field. We typically
assumed that the emitted photons are incoherent (both in the classical and the
quantum sense), so that the emitted electromagnetic field can be considered as
an ensemble of photons. Then, we can idealise the experiments as setting filters
that allow only very narrow frequency (energy) range to pass and measure the
intensities. The whole experiment is then fully described by energy measure-
ments of the photons. One can give an equivalent description in terms of the
electromagnetic fields. So the actual observables that correspond to the set-up
of the experiment is photon energies or fluxes, not atomic energies. And these
energies can be described by continuous variables in either quantum theory or
in the quantum process description.
The attribution of discrete energy values to the atom comes from a semiclas-
sical picture of the atom/field interaction; it involves a mixture of old quantum
theory concepts (orbitals, transitions), with the framework of mature quantum
theory. This picture is helpful for calculations, it provides an intuitive picture
of the interaction, but it is not fundamentally quantum mechanical. A pre-
cise treatment ought to consider the combined system field-atom, interacting
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perhaps through QED and then consider energy measurements of the electro-
magnetic field at particular spatial locations. In such a description all infor-
mation about the process (including the atom’s eigenvalues) would be found in
the correlation functions of the electromagnetic field: but these are predicted by
quantum processes in full agreement with standard quantum theory.
What we imply by this argument, is that historically the discrete values of
observables actually refer to the spectrum of the Hamiltonian, rather than any
arbitrary observable. The information about its eigenvalues is fully contained
in the correlation functions: once these are provided, we can read off any dis-
cretised behaviour. In other words, the discrete behaviour in quantum theory is
not fundamental or ontological, but arises due to particular forms of the dynam-
ics. This is true even for spin systems: the ”discrete” spin values are always
measured in conjunction with its coupling to some magnetic field.
7 Conclusions
Let conclude in the form of a summary:
1. We argued that complex numbers (or a U(1) invariance of probabilities)
is an inherent and irreducible component of quantum probability. Their effect
is the existence of statistical quantities that can be determined by experiment
that have no analogue in quantum probability: these are the geometric phases
that can be determined by comparing two distinct histories of the system.
Compared to classical probability these phases correspond to novel operational
concepts.
2. The consistent histories approach provides the best formalism to take the
phase information into account: there exists an 1-1 map between observable
quantities (including phases) and mathematical objects. This comes from the
relation of the values of the decoherence functional to the Pancharatnam phase.
We do not need, however, to subscribe to the standard interpretation of consis-
tent histories. Throughout this paper we prefer to keep an operational perspec-
tive.
3. Taking phases as primitive objects of the formalism necessitates the use
of non-additive probabilities. Theories with non-additive probabilities can be
described by commutative observables (or classical logic or hidden variables)
without violating Bell’s theorem or Kochen-Specker’s theorem.
4. We can write a theory of quantum processes in analogy with the theory of
stochastic processes. This theory has a well-defined sample space 7 (we choose
7 In a recent paper, Kent makes the very accurate remark that the quantum measurement
problem should be more accurately phrased as what is exactly the sample space of the quantum
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the classical phase space). The only difference is that in the quantum case the
relevant object is a “density matrix” in the space of paths. In this picture,
the Schro¨dinger equation is an exact analogue of the Fokker-Planck equation.
Moreover, we can unravel the statistical description to write (at least formally)
quantum equations. They can be thought of, as corresponding to individual
systems; whether they correspond to real physics is doubtful, but they prove
that Einstein’s suggestion that quantum theory is a statistical theory arising out
of yet unknown physics for the individual system is possible and not in conflict
with any predictions of quantum theory.
5. Its physical implications aside, it would be very interesting to see if the
solutions to quantum differential equations can be found numerically. We would
be, then, able to simulate the evolution of individual quantum systems.
6. Starting from quantum processes we get standard quantum theory, by
assuming the Markov property, time homogeneity, time-reversibility and the
non-triviality of the kinematical process. Hence, the structure of the Hilbert
space necessitates the Markov condition, which presupposes a background causal
structure. In absence of this the Hilbert space is not necessary or even natural.
This could be the case in quantum gravity.
7. Finally, we want to identify, how the spacetime symmetries are implemented
in the theory of stochastic processes: the relation with the histories quantisa-
tion programme guided our choice of sample space. After all, our motivation
is to find a covariant description of quantum systems, that would allow us to
tackle the quantisation of gravity. What we would like to see is that the com-
plex phases of quantum theory, would be deeply intertwined with the spacetime
structure (perhaps in a fashion analogous to an old conjecture by Penrose?).
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